Again a lot of numbers, so I'd like if somebody could check them, and suggest reading if necessary - I did read some books which provided information on Roman and Byzantine logistics, but they were not specifically books on logistics. And army in question actually uses Late Medieval technology (cca 1480s), though organization is similar to Middle Byzantine army. ---------------------------------------------------- For a two-week march, a 15 000 men force (two legions plus auxilliaries) requires 288 400 kg of grain for soldiers' rations - 115 360 kg for a standard 6 000 men force. Horses and mules significantly increase this – while light horses used by scouts and rangers can subside entirely off the grass, large war horses require a supply of food, around 15 kg per day, while normal war horse requires 9 kg per day, and same for pack or draft horse, while mule would require 7,5 kg per day. Further, each cavalryman has to have a war horse, a riding horse and a pack horse. 2 000 cavalry in usual legion thus requires 6 000 horses, of which 800 heavy war horses, 1 200 average-sized war horses, 2 000 riding horses, and 2 000 pack horses or mules. Assuming mules instead of pack horses, these would require a total of 59 000 kg of fodder per day or 826 000 kg for two weeks. In normal conditions a third of figure for animals is barley, which means animals will require 275 000 kg of barley over two weeks, for a total of 390 360 kg over two weeks. If there is no possibility for grazing at all, total requirements for a legion come for 941 360 kg over two weeks. A standard pack horse or a mule can carry a maximum of 120 kg over any distance. For a two-week march, a mule would carry 105 kg of barley for itself, leaving 15 kg free. Ridden cavalry horses would carry 34 kg of barley, unridden cavalry horses 68 kg of barley, and mules 84 kg of barley. Since soldiers can and do carry 14 to 17 days worth of food with themselves on the march (this includes animal guides), barley carried by mules would be that required by animals themselves. Horses themselves would carry 204 000 kg of barley. As such, a 6 000 strong legion on a two-week march would have 737 360 kg of barley carried by pack animals, requiring 6 145 mules. If grazing is available as an option, barley carried by pack animals is 186 360 kg, requiring 2 219 mules. Additional 600 mules are required to carry non-perishable equipment (tents, digging supplies etc.), one per decuria. Each heavy cavalryman also has two servants, although they are not always taken on campaign. These 1 600 assistants share 160 mules, and further 1 120 mules carrying fodder. Overall non-grazing requirement of a legion comes to 8 025 mules; if grazing is available, legion can make do with 2 979 mules. Army accompanied by pack animals can make 25 km per day in flat terrain, or 350 kilometers with above numbers; with ox carts, number is 20 km per day. Army with no carts and wholly mounted can move at pace of 52 km per day, and separate cavalry units can cover 64 km per day. A legion on a paved road may move 40 – 50 km per day regardless of weather. Oxen however would require no fodder, as they can obtain food by grazing; this however requires significant time, and may not be useful in mountainous areas. In flat areas, two mules can pull a wagon carrying 660 or cart carrying 500 kg. Two mules would require 210 kg of fodder for two weeks, leaving 450 kg for a two-week march or 240 kg for four-week march. As such, a legion would require 868 – 2 092 wagons for two week march (280 – 350 km) or 1 626 – 3 922 wagons for four-week march (560 – 700 km). These would require 1 736 to 7 844 mules – former number being mere one fifth of number required in mountainous areas. If using carts – of lesser capacity but more agile in hard terrain – numbers are 380 (with grazing) – 1 504 (no grazing) carts for two-week march and 2 330 (with grazing) – 9 217 carts (no grazing) for four-week march. Four-week march is standard which provincial officials have to set aside for an army, but supply dumps are set at two-week distances from one another. All numbers are increased in practice by some 10 – 20% in order to compensate for losses during the march, and do not include servants' mules. Above limitations however only really apply for armies that have more than one legion present, as an individual legion is small enough to feed itself through foraging when in enemy territory. Even so, foraging is one of riskiest activities of an army, as foraging parties could be attacked, or else fail to acquire enough supplies. When being fed by foraging, each 15 000 – strong army will be 10 – 15 miles away from the closest similarly-sized army; usual recommendation is 20 miles. If supplied by logistical network instead of foraging, five legions (40 000 men) is usual upper limit of what can be deployed in a single army for any extended period of time, although up to 60 000 is possible, and larger armies may be deployed by joining up forces for a single battle. Water transport is far more efficient than overland transport. Large sailing ship can carry 900 tons of grain, with 600 tons for hulk-type ship and 300 tons for cog-type ship. Smaller ships used for riverine transport carry 20 to 30 tons. Equipment carried by a soldier is generally 50-60% of body weight. Assuming 150 lbs average, this means 75 lbs of equipment. Full plate weights 40 – 60 lbs (18 – 27 kg) with 50 lbs average, while heavy infantry half-plate weights 15 – 25 lbs (7 – 11 kg), with 22 lbs average. Weapons weights are 5 lbs (poleaxe), 2,4 lbs (arming sword), 10 oz / 486 g (dagger); as such, total weight carried by an infantryman is 30 lbs / 13,6 kg. This leaves 45 lbs for food and other accessories.
Very detailed. Is this an academic work? If not, I would not really worry about accuracy. When I read fiction - historical fiction, sci fic, fantasy, thrillers, etc - I want to be entertained. I'm not concerned with all the details. That said, I was wondering if all the armies of the time did their own supply? Eric Flint's 1632 series mentions camp followers and merchants that sell to the soldiers - or their quartermasters - rather than having section of the army responsible for foraging for supplies. Also you mentioned that fodder might not be available in some regions like mountains. In those locales couldn't the army use native animals for the transportation of things such as goats or donkeys? You may want to track down a documentary on the development of food in America on the history channel. They said in one part of the series that part of the reason the US military was so successful in WW2 was that the Americans had developed a method of canning food and preserving it so it could be used to feed the soldiers. This apparently freed up the soldiers to soldier rather than forage. I know it's not where you were going but it is interesting....
@Cdn Writer 1) Not an academic work, but rather background information. 2) Army still has to forage for supplies. Camp followers and merchants are, if anything, a strain on logistics. Which is why Romans tried to get rid of them. 3) Depends on whether a) such animals are available and b) procuring them is practical. 4) Shouldn't that be earlier? Canned food was introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1795 or so, so if US military only introduced canned food in 1940s, they were some 150 years behind...
1. The level of detail is more than most people will know. I think the only people who would know all that info off the tops of their heads are the quarter masters and their staff. I'm not too sure the leaders of the army would know this? My impression of the military leaders is that they plan attacks and expect their soldiers to win battles/wars for them. Are they really going to know that the military is not 100% because the guys don't have enough food? I guess they might take an interest if they had a new weapon like elephants and were working out the logistics of using them in battle but soldiers and horses they've used in every war for the last 30 years? 2. New to me. I always thought they were a help, not a hindrance to armies in the field. I guess they do have the opportunity to poison supplies of food and spread disinformation but I always thought they were more good than bad. 3. Makes sense, didn't think that one through very well. 4. I wasn't really paying attention. It was just a couple of lines in a documentary that I only thought of when I read about "foraging" in your original post. I don't recall canned food that lasted becoming a thing til after the 1950s in North America though. Not sure what the innovation was if it was not "canning" - maybe flash freezing food? A new method for preserving it....bah...
As I said, it is background information. So what readers (and even characters) will see are the outcomes of that, not the details themselves. Army in its own territory will have logistical support aparatus provided by the provincial apparatus, meaning that merchants and such will sell stuff to quartermasters, not to the army itself. http://deremilitari.org/2014/05/the-organisation-and-support-of-an-expeditionary-force-manpower-and-logistics-in-the-middle-byzantine-period/ Any not-strictly-necessary addition to the army is hindrance, as it means more supplies will be necessary... remember Sun Tzu: ten bushels of grain have to be expended in order to get one bushel to troops. Well, for something to become a thing, you first have to figure out how to mass-produce it. And first cans weren't perfectly safe either. As I recall, a couple of expeditions in 19th century had issues with lead seals on cans poisoning the food... BTW, I came across this as well; looks interesting: https://books.google.hr/books?id=bQi4CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT135&lpg=PT135&dq=byzantine+army+supply&source=bl&ots=UVOJMRmU--&sig=ACfU3U0NM9FSz5y_3rRQcxlTDT0EXez5Kg&hl=hr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi2zIHXg7nnAhW-AxAIHcNkCjEQ6AEwF3oECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=byzantine%20army%20supply&f=false
an army that has to forage is very vulnerable to a scorched earth approach by its adversary... better to carry the food you need with you in well guarded supply trains - also in a state of war the provincial apparatus will be in chaos and unreliable for any army to depend on
That is impossible over long distances, unless you are following sea coast or a navigable river. Animals pulling the carts with food eat food themselves, meaning that there is literally no amount of wagons or carts that will allow the army to sustain itself indefinitely.
Again we come to the core part of every single thread like this - are you asking or telling ? If you already have all the answers and just want to display your knowledge - do it somewhere else, like a blog. If you want to learn - less arguing and more listening would be to your benefit. That aside resupply has been a central tenet of military logistics pretty much forever... a roman legion for example would carry enough food to sustain it for a finite period, after which it would need to be resupplied from the rear... by the means of guarded convoys sent forward from their nearest safe supply base, they only depended on foraging (and tax) to supplement the rations once they had established frontiers and bases not while they were advancing or retreating in campaign mode. An army in advance cannot depend on foraging for its food since it is desperately vulnerable to as i said scorched earth tactics by the adversary retreating in front of it, and army in retreat cannot depend on foraging since it is being harassed and pursued by the enemy. There is a lot of info here on the logistical needs of the roman army http://www.legioxxirapax.com/zasoby/The_Logistics_of_the_Roman_Army_at_War_(264BC_-_235AD).pdf you will note that it says in the section on foraging that although fodder, water and wood was gathered locally and frequently (except in desert campaigns when it was carried), the collection of foodstuffs was a major undertaking nneeding a lot of troops and was only carried out occasionally in order to resuply a major campaign
I have theoretical knowledge, but that is mostly based around tactics/strategy. I am far less confident when it comes to organization and, specifically, logistics - especially when you include numbers. I do try to do my research, but I still prefer somebody else to double-check the numbers and stuff. And in my experience, arguing is the best way to learn stuff, as it forces everyone to actually think about what is being written. Does that mean that armies basically followed rivers in campaigns? E.g. Heraclius spent a lot of time campaigning in Persia, how did he support his troops? This map has both forces sometimes following rivers and sometimes not. And how did everybody (Romans/Byzantines, Persians, Arabs, Turks) support armies of tens of thousands when crossing Anatolia, especially given that mountain passes (Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges, specifically) could be blocked? Makes sense, though the very fact scorched earth tactics were used so often indicates that premodern armies did utilize foraging to help logistics whenever possible. Maybe I should look at Hannibal's logistics during Italian campaign. Thanks. Will definitely read it. Is there similar book on Byzantine logistics, or two are similar enough that there is no need for it (possible, given organizational continuity army displayed from Roman Imperial to Middle Byzantine periods)? So basically, food was carried by the train, while water was only carried by soldiers for immediate needs.
Arguing is not discussing. Armies would requisition supplies from captured territory as well as foraging. The Romans had a well developed system for requisitioning supplies and resupplying their troops from friendly territory. One of the most important things for an army to do is secure its supply lines as it advances. It does not carry all the food it needs, because the area behind it is captured territory. A general will not march his troops into the middle of hostile territory for all sorts of reasons. Hannibal obtained his supplies from Carthage, but when that was not possible, he had to obtain them locally from captured territory in southern Italy. Otherwise, he could be resupplied from Carthaginian territory in Iberia.
Could the military ship supplies ahead? Like via ship and have them anchor off the coast til the army appeared, then unload the cargo when the army was there to receive it? Not perfect but it could possibly help with supplying the army.
That was one of the ways armies were supplied. Another was to have fleet follow the army; I believe that was done by Crusaders at one point (Richard the Lionheart).
