15th century heavy cavalry

If we take 15th century heavy cavalry (cca 1480), how effective it would be on the battlefield? And what would be the best mix of troops (heavy cavalry - mounted archers - heavy infantry - archers)?

This is what I managed to find:
Hungarian banderia in 1515. had 8 950 men, of which 2 175 heavy cavalry (24,3%), 2 825 light cavalry (31,6%), 400 mounted infantry (4,5%), 1 600 musketeers (17,9%), 50 archers and 1 900 melee infantry (21,2%), that is, 3 950 infantry (44%) and 5 000 cavalry (56%). Black Army of Matthias Corvinus in 1463. had 2 000 cavalry (28,5%) and 5 000 infantry (71,4%), but in 1485. it had 20 000 cavalry (71,4%) and 8 000 infantry (28,6%).

But no indication for why of changing proportion of troops, or why it ended so cavalry-heavy.

 

The above does suggest that heavy cavalry was fairly effective, seeing how Hunyadi defeated several Ottoman forces more numerous than his own.

Are there any good sources on campaigns of John Hunyadi? They might answer that question (maybe), but the best I had been able to find were rather short descriptions.

 

I understand the impact of terrain, though I am not certain about impact of archers on heavy armoured cavalry - IIRC, French cavalry wiped out English archers a couple of times in later stages of 100-year-war. But that is also something I will need to take a look at.

Wasn't Hunyadi beaten because he was not able to control the nobles? I managed to find descriptions in old Husar magazines (hooray for my magazine-hoarding tendencies). At Varna, Hunyadi's army had nearly won: Hunyadi and Mihail Szilagy had destroyed sipahis of Rumelia which made up Ottoman right wing. Sipahis had in fact been close to winning against Szilagy at first, but Hunyadi caught them in the flank. Meanwhile, Sipahis of Anatolia had managed to destroy Christian right wing after bishon Jan Domenik led his cavalry into futile attack on Ottoman skirmishers in nearby forrest, opening his flank to attack. However, sipahis themselves got caught in flanking attack by returning central reserve under Hunyadi, and broke.

Then Polish-Hungarian-Croatian king decided that he had been left out of the fun for far too long, and launched a head-on cavalry charge against Janissari infantry which was in fortified positions. Naturally, the attack failed and king got himself killed, which led to mass running away by Christian forces, and thus their slaughter.

And this was a 16 000-men army fighting an army of 50 000.

At Kosovo, same thing. Hunyadi managed to collect 32 000 men. On first day, Hunyadi deployed only cavalry, whereas infantry was left to guard the wagenberg. As a result, he only had 15 000 men on the actual field of battle. Ottomans on the other hand deployed infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings, with a total of 50 000 - 60 000 troops on the field of battle. But while Hunyadi expected that Ottomans will first deploy light cavalry, Ottomans instead deployed sipahis from the onset - which meant that Christian heavy cavalry, deployed behind light missile cavalry, could not meet enemy charge before light cavalry got out of the way - and once it did, it was too late for countercharge, and they had to basically receive Ottoman charge. Hunyadi had to reinforce the wings - this time he had no reserve - so when Azap infantry attacked Christian center, it was forced back until infantry left the camp and counterattacked. Christians managed to force back Ottoman left wing, but the day ended before this could result in any conclusive outcome.

On second day, Hunyadi actually deployed infantry in the center, and said infantry - composed of, as I mentioned, ranged infantry (crossbowmen and some gunners) managed to force Ottoman infantry back, forcing sultan to deploy the reserves (basically, everyone who could hold weapons) which stabilized the situation. But sipahis from Thessaly managed to bypass and attack from the rear Christian left wing. Ivan Sekelj died in the attack, whereupon Wallachian vojvoda Dan surrendered with 6 000 men. Hunyadi ordered a retreat back to the camp. Hunyadi and portion of the army escaped during the night, while rest of the army remained to hold the camp, and got slaughtered to the last man.

Problem is, description I have is kinda short - it is in military magazine - and I'd like some more detail. Overall, it seems that infantry alone cannot withstand heavy cavalry charge but rather requires some sort of obstacle - ditch and a pallisade, or else a wagenburg - between itself and charging 15th century cavalry. But this may also be due to type of infantry - I am uncertain of which anti-cavalry weapons Ottoman infantry (specifically Azaps here) utilized (Wiki does say they used polearms, but question is what they used in this particular battle and how were they deployed). On the other hand, Hunyadi himself heavily utilized infantry in the battles which he did win - but at Varna, there was no infantry, whereas at Kosovo it was left in the camp (since it was structured for sieges, not for open-field battle). As a result, while normal battle deployment saw both Hunyadi and Ottomans deploy infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings, in these two battles Hunyadi had to deploy cavalry across the entire line. Hunyadi also normally utilized wagons in his battles - but both of battles that are described here saw wagons used only to fortify the camp, whereas I have found indications that he normally used some of the wagons in offensive manner. But again, very few details.

And so the only conclusion I could draw is that heavy cavalry "can" be effective against disciplined infantry in certain circumstances, but I still do not know what these circumstances are (I do know that it cannot be effective if infantry is in fortified position, such as behind wagons or a ditch-and-pallisade - but this counts under "terrain"). I have also concluded that infantry is still a good idea - to tie down the enemy infantry - but again, no clue as to what would be the best balance between infantry and cavalry, between missile and heavy cavalry, etc. in a structured military. Only thing I have are Byzantine manuals, but Byzantine cavalry of 10th century and Western European of 15th are completely different things.

End result, I still don't know how effective Western heavy cavalry exactly is, and even less do I know about Hunyadi's normal tactics.

P.S. Unrelated, but word "hussar" may come from two sources: latin cursarius, which means a bandit, or else Hungarian husz which means twenty (law of 1397. required Hungarian nobility to equip one cavalryman from every 20 working serfs). Serbs took Hungarian word, and transformed it into gusar, which in Serbian language means bandit, but in Croatian language has a specific meaning of a corsair. This may have been because hussars were used as raiders.

 

To continue with Moose's post, William the Conqueror had a group of cavarly at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. He used his land troops to 'stage' retreats, baiting out Saxon soldiers to break formation before using the speed of the mounted soldiers to swoop in, surround them, and stab them to death. Additionally, he also used the cavalry to try to bait the shield wall into breaking--he'd run the horses full speed towards the wall, then stop at the last second if they stayed put. The thunder of those hooves rushing at you full speed is enough to make all but the bravest soldier break that line. Guess the Saxon's had balls of steel 'cause that line didn't break. So instead he had them ride up, throw some spears, and then ride back down. That didn't work either.

Then the archers played the greatest game of Gunbound in history, arched their shots, and hit Harold in the eye with a sweet 360 no scope.

Edit: I think ole' Ghengis was a pro at mounted archery as well. The takeaway being that the important of maneuverability on the battlefield can't be overstated. Unless you're fighting 300 Spartans wedged into a gap by a cliff. Probably don't want horses then.

 

Actually, it is an easy one, and not by virtue of being a military historian, military professional, but also of Roman descent and similar region as John, Wallachia, .the land of the walla, valums, roman and byzntine walls criss crossing southern and central Romania, hundreds of kilometres. It is fun on walking on those known as Valu lui Traian, one can lose a modern battle tank in the deep ditch facing north. Valul lui Traian ran 70 kms? Anyhow, back to John, in the 1400s, the latin identity was far more understood and culturally significant than most people can imagine today, by virtue of language, and culture they understood themselves as latins, but dared not call themselves Romans as the last has nearly been wiped at Constantinople.

By the mid 15th century, the Ottoman empire had become the most significant threat to language and religion to poles, Latins (pre modern romanians) and so on. Their conquest seemed unstoppable, more so that Constantinople riches and the Theodossian walls failed to stop them. by virtue of manpower tribute (young boys) and riches, the ottoman empire fielded the most sophisticated professional army and infantry of the time. Perhaps not as strong as post marian legions, but the best of their time.

Therefore, by 1470s Europeans learned one thing- you could not match the turks on infantry numbers and strengths. Period. It was an invitation for disaster. In addition, in economic terms, it was impossible for Wallachians, Poles and Moldavians (Stephen the Great) to muster professional infantry armies. they were always levied armies, and courage aside, inferior to the ottoman units. Only cunning and surreal battle planning and tactics enabled the locals to defeat the ottoman in successive disasters that annihilated 120,000-200,000 men by the 1500s?

Landowners, however, were many, wealthy enough to afford horses and equipment, although, in eastern Europe, not as elaborate as Western/Norther European steel works. But if you were a landowner in 1450s Wallachia, with 500-1000 serfs, you went to battle on a horse, at own expense, not on foot.

Since large standing infantry armies were economically impossible, and tactically inferior to Ottoman units, the Wallachian latins merged force employment with economics. Lessons from Nicopolis and Varna compelled an increase in cavalry ratios. Mattias Corvinus and Ioanus adopted rapdid mobility, denial tactics, harassment and attrition. these were never meant to charge frontally janissaries, but to move fast, deny forage and water, hit and run. Confusing the French Crecy cavalry with John's would be a crucial functional error. The French cavalry, even accounting for crusades, never faced the height and might of ottoman infantry and cavalry, or it would have ceased to exist.Nor was Eastern European cavalry created to break down Ottoman infantry, but, at the very least, neutralize ottoman cavalry and preserve the precious nuclei of core infantry.

The north of Danube strategies thus evolved around smaller infantry, a pin that immobilizes the opponent, funnelling far larger armies, harassing cavalry and, once the enemy is broken (Battle of Valea Albă, also known as the Battle of Războieni), chase the surviving ottoman units for days, hundreds of kilometres if necessary. Walking some of those battlefields, or countries, it becomes clear that direct open field cavalry charges were not possible in very large numbers- definitely not in the Transylvania/Serbia/Carpathian areas. In such terrain inhibiting locations, one can visualize how or why infantry become a pin, and cavalry a final blow hammer, but one that started poking the ottomans weeks prior, or denying approaches to Ottoman cavalry.

Both at Nicopolis and Varna, the defeated forces learned that ottoman cavalry units, even light cavalry, were far more lethal than numbers or weapons could suggest. This threat vector had to be neutralized.

Survivability must also have played a role. Direct infantry battles, if lost to the Ottomans, would have proven irrecoverable. Cavalry heavy armies, however, can always, and generally did escape the opponents, and lived to fight again.

So we may thus conclude that cavalry was adopted for the purpose of mobility, denial of Ottoman mobility/cavalry, harassment, hit and run and rundown post main battle. It was an economic weapon, a far better option to standing infantry armies that local economies could not sustain, and was never meant to be used as a decisive battlefield weapon as the French attempted at Crecy or Agincourt..

 

excellent post, man

 

1480 was the beginning of Matthias Corvinus' wars against the Holy Roman Empire and conquest of Austria / Bohemia; it's a unique period in military history because the king had a standing army of Hussite mercenaries armed 1/4 with firearms. That is, the period directly after John Hunyadi and before your quoted Banderia had the kingdom face Western Europe instead of the Ottomans - and adopt a more Ottoman-like army composition of war wagons and footmen. There's far more reliable / detailed sources on the Black Army than other armies of the era - and in Black Army sources you'll see that cavalry already played a largely supportive/auxiliary role to infantry formations. I'd definitely call it the "most efficient army of its era" considering the wild amount of victories over both Ottomans and Germans.

As for more specific efficiency & tactics, the Hungarian-language wikipedia has a sketch of the Schattwien formation from 1487 underlying my arguments; a formation with an infantry column in the centre, flanking cavalry, guns & war wagons and a heavy infantry formation surrounding it all. The infantry is followed by gunmen.

So to answer your question...

The most efficient & strongest army of the era wielded 1/4 firearms, which was /the/ defining factor of it.

There's two sources for infantry: one from an invasion force reported by Venice quoting 3/4 infantry, and one from the triumphant entry into Wienerneustadt with 4/5 cavalry. The historical estimates/consensus is that their share was equal in the army (1:1) - at least there's three historians quoted on Wikipedia to assert this conclusion.

Also note that the Black Army carried field guns to battle - the same Venetian report notes 30 siege bombards (mortars) and 30 small bombards, twelve "great cannons", 64 naval bombards on warships, 34 smaller bombards on auxiliary ships - these were serviced by a total of 80 "gunmasters" and 300-400 artillerymen.

Cavalry wasn't heavy only - it was a mix of light & heavy cavalry. You'll need light cavalry to fight small war, which was growing in importance during the era. This was the birth of the Hussars who - along with the cossacks - became the defining light cavalry force of most nations until WW1. I don't think there were any mounted archers deployed on either side of the conflicts the Black Army participated in - considering the novelty & use of firearms, I more expect mounted gunmen than archers.

 

Excellent, thanks. I always believed that dominance of cavalry was due to Ottoman strategy which used raids to "prepare" the area for conquest, but your explanation makes sense of why cavalry would also be preferred for direct engagements.

Thanks!

 

@Aldarion

Lots of great replies here, some I agree with others I don’t. Your question of effectiveness on the battlefield was not answered. Has you will probably know Calverley of any form is a primarily a flanking unit. It is there to cause disruption and confusion within the structured format of the enemies rank and file.

A frontal assault on an enemy’s front line would be done via infantry and artillery. The Calverley units would attack from a flanking position only. This hopefully causing the enemy to route.

Heavy Calverley units are expensive. The individual rider will be of higher class or status than a regular solider. The rider will probably own his horse and equipment. This is important to understand within the mix of the entire army. You cannot have an army that consists of 100% special forces...!

The Calverley are a shock component of an army’s offensives capabilities, but are flawed when expected and a square can be arranged in time.

An army built up of all heavy Calverley will never succeed. It’s a team game and all need to play a part. Am happy to discuss this further with you at length. Just head me up...


MartinM